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EXPECTATIONS, LIFE EXPECTANCY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ABSTRACT
Unlike price expectations, which are central to macroeconomic theory
and have been examined extensively using survey data, formation of individ-
uals' horizons, which are central to the theory of life—cycle behavior,
have heen completely neglected. This is especially surprising since life
expectancy of adults has increased especially rapidly in Western countries
in the past ten years. This study presents the results of analyzing
responses by two groups——economists and a random sample——to a questionnaire
designed to elicit subjective expectations and probabilities of survival.
It shows that people do not extrapolate past improvements in longevity when
they determine their subjective horizons, though they are fully aware of
levels of and movements within today's life tables. They skew subjective
survival probabilities in a way that implies the subjective distribution has
greater variance than its actuarial counterpart; and the subjective variance
decreases with age. They also base their subjective horizons disproportion-
ately on their relatives' longevity, and long—lived relatives increase
uncertainty about the distribution of subjective survival probabilities.
As one example of the many areas of life—cycle behavior to which the
results are applicable, the study examines the consumption—leisure choices
of the optimizing consumer over his lifetime. It finds that shortfalls in
utility in old age because people's ex ante horizons had to be updated as
average longevity increased are relatively small. This implies that large
subsidies to retirees under today's Social Security system cannot be





East Lansing, MI 48824
(517) 355—7349Americans are living longer than ever. The lowered death
rate, well below what was being projected a few years ago,
has enormous ramifications for the Social Security
program,1, insurance actuaries, employers, politicians and economists.—
I.Introduction and Background
Price expectations are central to modern macroeconomictheory. A
large amount of empirical work has used survey data to analyze how
expectations are formed (see Jonung, 1981; Jacobs and Jones, 1980, for
recent examples), and survey results were used even earlier in analyzing
inflation (see Turnovsky and Wachter, 1972). Central to thetheory of
the utility—maximizing consumer is the notion of the horizon. Yet there
has been no comparable examination of how individuals formexpectations
about the horizons over which they maximize. This study begins torectify
this deficiency and uses the results to examine one particular issue of
life—cycle behavior.
Several theoretical models have considered more than a fixed
length of life: Yaari (1965) examined optimal lifetime consumption plans
under the assumption of a known, unchanging vector of survivalprobabilities;
Levhari and Mirman (1977) considered how consumption is affectedby a mean—
preserving change in lifetime uncertainty; and Arthur (1981) has examined
how changing actuarial survival probabilities affect life—cyclemaximization.
I use the survey data to discover the shape of the entire distribution of
subjective survival probabilities in order to examine whether empirical
work can rely on current life tables, and whether increases in life
expectancy that may motivate theoretical interest are incorporated in
individuals' expectations.
Life expectancies of adults in developed Western nations have been
12
increasing at a remarkably rapid pace in the last fifty years, though the
maximum attainable age has not increased (Fries, 1980). (Throughout I
use the term "life expectancy" to denote expected age at death.) This
growth has been especially pronounced in the past decade. Consider the
data in Table 1 for whites in the United States.-' (These standard
measures from life tables show life expectancies based on the mortality
rates observed in each year; they do not show the probabilities of survival
facing a particular cohort as it ages.') They present a picture of
relatively rapid increases. For example, life expectancy among adult
whites age 45 increased by nearly two years in the 1970s, the most rapid
gain of any decade since 1910—1920. Similarly rapid increases appear to
have occurred in many other developed countries.-'1
The data from life tables make it clear that the distribution of
survival probabilities facing the consumer has been changing rapidly.
Whether the typical consumer is aware of these changes and incorporates
them into his subjective survival probabilities can be inferred from the
survey data. This inference and the results on the shape of the subjective
distribution are used in Section IV to examine the extent to which imperfect
foresight about cohort life tables reduces utility. These findings suggest
the appropriate size of the intergenerational transfer required to maintain
consumption of members of a cohort that on average is living longer than
it initially expected.
II. The Consistency of Forecasts of Survival
I seek to find how well subjective estimates of life expectancies
and survival probabilities meet a particular set of criteria that define
consistency, in the sense that they conform to available evidence and areTable 1
Life Expectancy in the United States, Whites, 1929 —1980







































































Source: Vital Statistics of the United States, 1977, Volume II, Section5,
and unpublished data from the National Center for Health Statistics.3
internally consistent. I judge people's beliefs about their own distribu-
tion of survival probabilities by the following criteria:
1) Is the individual's subjective life expectancy internally
consistent with his subjective probabilities of attaining various ages?
2) Is his subjective survival distribution consistéñt in shape
with actuarial survival distributions, or is it skewed?
3) Actuarial life expectancy is higher for older people; do we then
find that subjective life expectancies are higher for older people? Still
more important on this issue of 4 C consistency,is the representa-
tive individual's subjective life expectancy consistent with population
averages?
4) Are subjective life expectancies expectationally consistent; that
is, do people extrapolate past changes in survival probabilities in forming
their own subjective distributions?
5) Is the importance people attach to inheritance and personal
characteristics objectively consistent with evidence on their importance?
A. Data
The information used to analyze these five questions was culled
from questionnaires sent to two groups of respondents.--' The first was a
set of 650 white male academic economists. Some were associates of a
well—known semi—private organization devoted to empirical economics; most
were randomly chosen from the American Economic Association, Biogr8phical
Listing of Members, 1978. 63 percent of those surveyed (411 men) returned
usable responses. The respondents range in age from 26 to 65 and correspond
with a growing population.'
The economists' sample has the attraction that the respondents are
familiar with questionnaires and understand expectations and probabilities4
well; but this is a disadvantage insofar as it leads to responses that are
unrepresentative of what a typical consumer would respond. Accordingly,
questionnaires were sent to 975 people randomly chosen from the telephone
directory of a medium—sized Midwestern SMSA. Among the 47 percent who
responded, 363 were white males between ages 20 and 70 (who form the basis
from the analysis in this study)--".
The questionnaire (see the Appendix) provided responses on (x + e),
subjective life expectancy, and on p0 and 8O' subjective probabilities
of survival to ages 60 and 80 respectively.-' Additional questions allowed
the construction of variables used to test for objective consistency.
Included in these are variables reflecting the experience of the consumer's
parents and grandparents, and others reflecting his own actions. In the
former group is a vector of dummy variables indicating the number of parents
and grandparents who died of natural causes before age 60, and another
indicating the numbers of survived to age 80. In the latter group are
three dummy variables indicating if the person: 1) Smokes more than five
cigarettes per day; 2) Engages in vigorous exercise more than once a week;
and 3) Had in the past been diagnosed as having an illness that could be
fatal.
Table 2 presents sample statistics of the subjective estimates of
life expectancy and survival probabilities, and of the actuarial estimates
based upon the respondent's age. Most noteworthy among all our results
is the excess of (x + e) over (x +e),the actuarial life expectancy,
in both samples and in subsamples stratified by age. At the very least
this suggests that subjective life expectancy reflects life expectancy from
today's life tables. That subjective exceed actuarial life expectancies
mayevenimply that the respondents extrapolate past increases in longevity.Table 2
Means and Their Standard Deviations
Economists RandomSample
Ages 26—39 40—65 26—65 20—39 40—70 20—70
x+eS 75.91 76.41 76.91 75.81 77.74 76.79
X (.48) (.48) (.34) (.65) (.59) (.44)
x+e0 73.49 75.47 74.60 73.24 76.56 74.92
X (.02) (.09) (.07) (.04) (.15) (.12)
p0-1
83.58 82.76 83.19 80.27 82.05 80.90
(.81) (1.17) (.70) (1.25) (2.32) (1.15)
84.43 87.94 86.13 83.95 88.78 85.66
(.05) (.18) (.13) (.06) (.23) (.17)
p
37.83 40.78 39.49 42.21 45.97 44.12
(1.69) (1.82) (1.26) (1.96) (2.37) (1.54)
p00 33.63 36.28 35.12 33.44 38.61 36.06
8 (.02) (.16) (.11) (.02) (.33) (.22)
AGE 33.66 49.76 42.71 30.61 54.59 42.76
(.27) (.48) (.49) (.37) (.61) (.73)
180 231 411 179 184 363
-'On1ypersons less than 56 are included.5
Though subjective exceeds actuarial life expectancy in both younger
and older subsamples, the subjective probability of survival to age 60 is
less than the actuarial probability in the former subsamples, and In sub—
samples of 40—55 year—olds. This reversal hints there may be some internal
inconsistency in responses about subjective beliefs on survival. Finally,
mean subjective expectations and survival probabilities differ from their
actuarial counterparts by very similar magnitudes in the two samples. For
example, in the economists sample, (x + e8) —(x+ e°) =2.31,while in
the random sample it Is 1.87 years. These two differences are not signi-
ficantly different from each other, and the larger figure for the economists
is consistent with the sparse evidence on differences In longevity by
occupation and educatlon..V
B. Internal Consistency and Skewness
A test for internal consistency is provided by comparing deviations
of subjective from actuarial survival probabilities ([p0 —p0Jand
[pQ —p]) to the deviation of subjective from actuarial life expectancy
5 0
([es
—e]).Clearly, some people will be optimistic on subjective
probabilities and pessimistic on expectations, and vice—versa; but an
inference that the population's expectations are internally inconsistent
with their subjective probabilities can be made only if there is apre-
ponderance of optimists about expectancy who are pessimistic about pro-
babilities, or vice—versa. Tests for internal consistency are thus provided
by:
(1)ZEi P(p <pe5>e°)—P(p>pe5<e°),i =60,80
The statistics ZE1 are distributed binomially.6
Table 3 presents the estimated ZE1 for each sample and for subsamples
of younger and older workers. (Men 56+ are excluded because their
responses on p0 cannot be used.) Among the economists there is fairly
strong evidence of inconsistency between subjective expectations. and each
of the subjective survival probabilities. Moreover, the inconsistency
implies that the respondents' probability distributions are less optimistic
than their subjective responses on life expectancy imply. The results are
not so strong in the random sample, though some evidence for this same
finding exists when the entire sample is used. (Pooling both samples,
ZE6O =.137,t =3.55;ZE8O =.064,t =1.73.)The results suggest
people think about survival probabilities differently from the way they
envision what we might equate with the "horizon," our measure e
Without knowing whether the complete subjective distribution, or just the
subjective life expectancy, motivates behavior, one cannot say which is
the more appropriate basis for analyzing life—cycle behavior; our results
show, though, that implications for behavior will differ depending on how
one models survival probabilities.
Skewness in the distribution of subjective survival probabilities









Positive (negative) value implies the individual's subjective distributions
have more (less) variance than the actuarial distributions of survival
probabilities. (Alternatively, it implies that the subjective survival
function is flatter (.steeper).)Table 3
Tests of Internal Consistency and Skewness
ZE6O ZE8O Z6080
Economists
26—39 .085 .119 —.045
(1.19) (1.72) (—.64)
40—55 .233 .111 .146
(3.46) (1.77) (2.13)
26—55 .158 .093 .047
(3.24) (1.94) (.95)
Random Sample
20—39 .128 —.005 .143
(1.69) (—.07) (1.99)
40—55 .091 —.004 .085
(.95) (—.05) (.89)
20—55 .128 —.002 .125
(2.14) (—.03) (2.18)
in parentheses here and in Tables 4—6.7
Estimates of (2) are presented in the final column of Table 3.
Almost all are positive, and those for the random sample (except for
persons 40—55) are significantly positive. (Pooling both samples, Z6080
.0875, t =2.22.)The surveys provide some evidence that subjective
survival distributions have greater variance then does the actuarial
distribution. This result may be unsurprising, in that the subjective
distributions are based on each individual's views, while actuarial
distributions are based on population experience. It suggests, though,
that empirical work involving life—cycle behavior cannot correctly use
actuarial survival probabilities, but should at least skew these around
0eso that they have greater variance. Thus studies examining life—cycle
consumption (eg., Skinner, 1981) will go awry using actuarial measures, for
they will overestimate near-term survival and underestimate (compared to
people's subjective distributions) survival from 60 until very old age.
So too, studies that construct measures of lifetime earnings (eg., Irvine,
1981) to be used in empirical work based in the life—cycle model should use
weighted sums of earnings with weights based on actuarial data adjusted
for the skewness we have found.
C. Demographic and Expectational Consistency
The sample statistics in Table 2 suggested that the respondents'
subjective life expectancy is roughly coincident with today's life tables.-'1
To evaluate the demographic consistency of expectations more formally,
consider the equation:
(3) x + e5 = +1[x + e°]
If subjective expectations are consistent with today's life table,
E(0) =0,and E(1) =1;that is, the subjective mean equals the actuarial8
mean from current data, and men whose actuarial life expectancy is one
year greater respond that their subjective horizon is one year greater.
Tests of these hypotheses can be made using the estimates in columns
(1), (2), (5) and (6), in Table 4. The regressions that constrain
I3,
0
(columns (1) and (5)) show quite clearly that l is not significantly
different from one. However, the standard errors of estimate of the
unconstrained equations. (columns (2) and (6) are below those of the
respective constrained equations. (In each case the constant term is
significantly greater than zero at least at the 90 percent level.) This
result, along with the observation that is withIn two standard errors
of one, but more than two standard errors above zero, suggests that people's
subjective horizons slightly exceed the actuarial horizon, but that demo-
graphic consistency describes differences by age quite well.
I defined expectational consistency as requiring that subjective
life expectancy reflects the extrapolation of available information. To
formalize this, rewrite (3) as:
(4) x + e + 1[x + e ]— 2e [x + e]
If people extrapolate past improvements in life expectancy (see Table 1) as
continuing at some positive rate into the future, differences in the
subjective horizons among those men who have more years of life remaining
0
(for whom e is greater) will respond less to differences in actuarial
horizons than will differences in x + e5 among older men. Thus2 > 0
is equal to the annual rate of increase in life expectancy that the
average person in the sample expects. If 2 < 0, we can only infer that
people do not believe past trends will continue; whether this is becauseTable 4
Determinants of Subjective Life Expectancy: Tests for













































6.861 6.854 6.848 6.8538.281 8.252 8.264 8.2609
they believe that health technology will cease improving, or because of a
nonzero subjective probability that a catastrophe will occur, cannot be
distinguished from our results.
Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) present estimates of equation (4) for
each sample, with and without constrained to zero. The estimates suggest
very clearly that is non—positive: The upper ends of the 95 percent
confidence intervals around the from columns (7) and (8) are + .0016 and
+ .0036 respectively. If the average person (age 43 in each sample)
projected trends of the last 40 years, would have been .041. Even if
people projected trends from the 1960's, the decade of least rapid improve-
ments in adult white male longevity, 2 would equal .013. Clearly, white
men do not expect past trends in longevity to continue)1 Whether they
are aware of these trends and do not consider them, or whether they are
not aware, the results suggest that today's life tables are good proxies
for people's expectations today. The conclusion thatl =1is also
supported by the estimates in columns (4) and (8).
D. Objective Consistency
To examine whether individual variation in subjective life expectancies
is related to objective characteristics other than life—table data, a vector
Z consisting of the dummy variables discussed in part A was added to equation
(4). Table 5 shows the estimates of the expanded equation for the two
samples. The coefficients on the three dummy variables for old grandparents
suggest that each additional grandparent who survived to age 80 adds to the
respondent's subjective life expectancy. Conversely, the coefficients on
the dummy variables for young grandparents (with the insignificant exception
of the second grandparent in the random sample) imply that each additional
grandparent who died of natural causes before age 60 reduces the subjectiveTable 5



















































































life expectancy. Similar responses are observed for the variables
representing early and late decedents among parents, with the latter showing
particularly strong positive effects.
Despite the pattern of these coefficients, they appear far too
large in absolute value given the results of studies on the relation
between parents' and offspring's longevity. There is some evidence from
twins' studies (see Jarvik et al, 1960) of heritability of a high probability
of early death, but evidence on the heritability of longevity beyond this is
less clear. Whether the proxy variables represent heredity alone or also
reflect omitted environmental factors is unclear. Nonetheless, evidence
from regressions of age at death on parents' age at death (Rose and Bell,
1971) indicates that none of the environmental factors excluded from Z,
but correlated with parents' and grandparents' longevity, has nearly the
effect implied in our estimates. Other things equal, subjective life
expectancy of a person whose parents both survived to 80 is 7.71 years
(6.71 in the random sample) greater than that of someone whose parents died
of natural causes before age 60. This compares to the 2.1—year difference
based on the epidemiological evidence as suggested by Sehnert (1975, p. 132).
The effects of personal behavior on subjective life expectancy
are somewhat more consistent with the available evidence of their effect
on longevity. Persons in both samples appear aware of the detrimental
effects of smoking: The coefficients on this variable are quite close
to what is suggested by studies of its effects on longevity (see Preston,
1970). Similarly, though the economists attach no importance to exercise,
the random sample shows some recognition of its effects-?1 Finally, the
illness variable, essentially a control for a variety of factors, has the
expected negative effect.-'111
The comparisons of these results to evidence from biological
studies suggest that the respondents overestimate the importance of their
forebears' experience. That they do so is consistent with what Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) have called the "availability heuristic," an over—
reliance on readily available, apparently relevant information in
determining one's subjective beliefs on an issue. Objective consistency
is only partly satisfied. But people's overreliance on parents' experience
in forming their own horizons can enable future research using micro data
to examine life—cycle behavior to proxy individual horizons at least
partly by the respondents' parents' longevity.
III. The Determinants of Uncertainty About the Subjective Distribution
The discussion in the previous section implicitly dealt with
errors in forecasting by the average respondent. The effects of the
failure to observe internal and expectational consistency may be small,
though, compared to those caused by uncertainty about the subjective
probability distribution. Much of the recent literature (Levhar±
and Mirman, 1977; and Davies, 1981) stresses the role of uncertainty about
the horizon, rather than its expected length, in explaining consumption
profiles and saving behavior. These considerations suggest that it is
worthwhile to try to extract whatever information our sample contains
about the determinants of such uncertainty.
For each person below age 56 I fitted the Weibull survival
function:
P(t) =exp[_(?)1,t>x12
where c. and 0. are parameters, to the responses for p0 and p0.--' (This
is an exact fit: There are two parameters and two observations on each
person.) The fitted c. and 0. are then used to generate a distribution
of subjective survival probabilities from which themeans,variances, and
coefficients of variation of the subjective distributions can be
calculated.
The coefficient of variation of the implied subjective survival
distribution was regressed against the variables in Z,age, and measures
of the variance among each respondent's forebears' longevity. The best—
fitting forms of the equation are reported in Table 6. In unreported
regressions the variables representing smoking, exercise and illness had
t—statistics below .7; measures of the variance of forebears' longevity
did not fit as well as the longevity variables themselves; and continuous
measures of the number of parents or grandparents dying young or surviving
to age 80 produced lower a than did the vectors of dummy variables
included in Table 6. 288 of the 337 economists underage 56 were used
in this analysis, as were 225 of the 276 white men underage 56 in the
random sainple.1
The most striking result is the decline in the variance of the
subjective distribution with age; the decrease is observed whether or not
the equation is conditioned on forebears' longevity. This result should
not be surprising: Older people in the subsamples have avoided early
death, a low—probability event that greatly increases the variance of
observed lifetimes. The finding implies that the demand for life insurance
will be greater among younger persons in a risk—averse population. It
also means that one should not, as Davies (1981) has, treat the effects of
aging in a life—cycle model independently of assumptions about uncertaintyTable 6







Constant .239 .240 .283 .308
(8.81) (7.89) (8.93) (8.37)
Age —.0012—.0016 —.0019 —.0031
(—1.77) (—2.14) (—2.25) (—3.26)
Number of:
Old Grandparents .011 .011
(2.35) (1.45)
Old Parents .015 .064
(1.21) (2.52)
Young Grandparents —.0029 —.0085
(—.40) (—.74)
Young Parents —.0058 .018
(—.46) (.88)
a .0859 .0851 .1194 .1175
N 288 22513
of survival.
The results in columns (2) and (4) show fairly clearly thatmen
with long—lived forebears are more uncertain about their subjective survival
distribution, though men with forebears who died young are not less
uncertain. Coupled with the results in Table 5, these findings indicate
that having early decedents among one's forebears shifts the subjective
distribution to the left and narrows it (since the variance must decrease
with reduced mean if the coefficient of variation is unaffected);having
late decedents shifts it rightward and widens it. Thus parents'longevity
is partly a proxy for increased uncertainty about survivalas well as for a
more distant horizon.
IV. Intergenerational Transfers and Changing Subjective Horizons
The findings on the horizon and its uncertainty can be used to
analyze a number of specific issues in life—cycle behavior. In this
section I consider two of those: How changes in the subjective distribution
affect paths of consumption and labor supply, and the extent to whicha path
based on subjective probabilities such as those implied by our results
differs from one implied by perfect foresight about survival probabilities.
Examination of the first issue enables us to extend previous work on the
effect of differences in the horizon and uncertainty about it on lifetime
consumption (see, eg., Levhari and Mirman, 1977). Consideration of the
second point allows the calculation of the size of intergenerational
subsidies that would be required to maintain utility levels in an older
population that faced unexpected increases in longevity. Since one
justification for subsidies through social insurance is the desire to
avoid having older persons' consumption fall sharply because they could14
not plan well, the calculations provide estimates of the size of the
subsidy that is justified by this concern.-'
The simulation model builds on the work of Yaari (1965).I make
various assumptions about: 1) The degree of perfection in capital markets
(whether there exist actuarially fair annuities); 2) The relative importance
of consumption and leisure in a utility function that is strongly separable
in these arguments; and 3) The elasticity of utility with respect to
increases in consumption or leisure. I assume a generalized isoelastic
utility function:
(5) U =C1/l-+ aL1/l—
where C is consumption in any period; L equals one if the person is retired,
zero otherwise; andand a are parameters indicating the elasticity of
marginal utility to its arguments and the relative weights of consumption
and leisure.-' This simple formulation produces tractable optimal
lifetime consumption and labor supply paths.





where t is his current age; T is the maximum attainable age; and the vector
P(t,T),T t, is his forecast of the probability of survival to age T,with
P(t,t)=l. The simulations deal with white males; I assume the typical
person is age 20 in 1930 (by assumption, t1) and follow his utility—
maximizing choices of C and Lt from 1930 through 1979. For each set of
assumptions about the triad of parameters the model is simulated
under four sets of assumptions about the forecasts of survival probabilities:15
P1——The typical consumer in this cohort assumes that P(t,T), given
survival to age t, is what it was at t=l.P1 thus embodies completely
rigid forecasts; the consumer neither extrapolates past changes in survival
probabilities nor updates his forecasts based on recent changes in those
probabilities.
P2——The consumer forecasts his chances of survival from time t to
time -r based upon the life tables for year t. His forecasts are constantly
updated, but he does not expect continuing improvements in the life table.
This assumption is based on the evidence in Section II of demographic
consistency, and on the finding that people do not extrapolate past
improvements in the life tables.
P ——The consumer forecasts based on e° from the life tables at 3 x
time t, but his subjective survival probabilities are inconsistent in shape
with actuarial data, being flattened as I demonstrated in Section II.'
His forecasts are skewed and constantly updated, consistent with all the
evidence in Section II. P3 is a mean—preserving spread of
P2.
P4——The consumer has perfect foresight; at any time t he knows with
certainty what P(T, -r+k) will be, for allT> t. Essentially the consumer
knows ex ante what the cohort life table for his cohort will be.-' The
distinction between these assumptions is not trivial: For example, using
survival to age 85 (t=66), P1 (l,66)=.085, but P4(l,66)=.166.
Since the focus is on retirement, I assume that L0 for t35; that
L=l for t56; and that L cannot switch from one to zero.(These
assumptions reduce computing costs tremendously and correspond fairly
closely to reality.) Annual earnings are assumed exogeneous, and the only
source of income is past savings or current borrowing if L=l. Earnings are
assumed to follow a typical inverted—U path, and that path is assumed to16
to shift upward over time with the growth in real disposable income per
capita that took place between 1930 and l979.-' The typical consumer is
assumed to be fully aware of the life—cycle pattern of earnings but does
not extrapolate past improvements in real incomes.(The results do not
differ qualitatively if the consumer extrapolates the past ten years'
rate of change in per capital income.)
I make two polar assumptions about the nature of capital markets:
1) No borrowing is possible, so that wealth is always nonnegative; and
2) There is a perfect annuities market, so that the expected value of
wealth at T is zero, given a particular matrix P. assumed in the simu1ation.'
Given a vector L, and a particular isoelastic utility function, the optimal
lifetime consumption profile at T> t under the first assumption is:
(7) C(T) =C(t)exp{[(T-t)(r-p)+ J ds]}
subject to the constraint that:
(8) W(T) =W(t)er(T_t)+ fT[L(s)E(s)C(s)]e"Tds0, V
where E(s) are earnings in period s. The consumer cannot plan a consumption
profile that would require negative net worth at any future time. Under
the assumption that there is a market in actuarially perfect annuities
(see Yaari, 1965), the optimal consumption profile at T> t, given a
particular path of future L, becomes:
(9) C(T)C(t)exp{+[r—p][T--t]}




Under the assumption of no borrowing, incorrect forecasting of survival
probabilities is likely to lead to a greater departure of actual from ex
post (perfect forecasting) utility, for the existence of annuities markets
will enable the consumer to protect himself against the possibility of
unexpectedly long lifetime.
I simulate the optimal lifetime consumption and retirement paths for
1t50, for both assumptions about capital markets, and for various
assumptions about the triad (5,a,p). These parameters are chosen in most
cases so that the optimal retirement age, R, under assumption P1 is such
that 35<R<56. r is set equal to .03 in each simulation. For t>50 C and L
are those projected at t=50. The model is simulated by taking the vector
L(T), -r=t,...T, as given, and solving for optimal consumption according
to (7) or (9) with side constraints (8) or (10). All feasible vectors
L(T) are searched, and the optimal path is that for which the probabilistic
utility function (6) is maximized.
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the simulations under both
assumptions about the nature of capital markets, for six combinations of
parameters cS,a,and p. Two findings stand out immediately from consider-
ation of the optimal retirement age under the differing assumptions about
perceptions of survival probabilities: 1) Moving from P1 to P2 to P4,
there are only tiny changes in R. Apparently, under the assumptions that
condition the utility function, most of the increase in longevity that
occurs is consumed optimally in the form of leisure near the end of the
life cycle. 2) Comparing R under P2 and P3 in Table 7, we see that
introducing a mean—preserving spread into subjective survival probabilities
at each point in the life cycle leads in several cases to substantial
postponement in the age of retirement. However, as can be seen by comparingTable 7
Optimal Retirement Age, and Equalizing Percentage Increase
in Consumption, No Borrowing
(,a,p) Retirement Age, EqualizingIncrease in Consumption
R +19 Cohort—Weighted Unweighted
69 101 69 101
E Z
55 70 55 70
(.6, .9,.0l)
P 66 3.9727.87 4.47 49.40
P1 65 1.467.29 1.73 8.22
69 16.82 -11.14 19.25 —25.38
65
(.7,.6,.01)
P 64 .97 32.17 1.31 51.24
P1 64 1.546.74 1.78 7.17
65 7.7212.89 6.32 1.83
P4 64
(.75,. 6, .03)
P1 58 3.2134.95 3.69 53.65
P 58 .43 5.40 .68 5.69





62 5.7128.02 5.49 48.92
P2 61 .80 6.42 1.04 7.22
P3 65 18.71 —14.16 18.71 —25.79
P4 61
(.8,.55, .08)
P1 56 2.9633.60 3.33 52.18
P 56 .89 4.63 1.07 4.86





75 —1.07 11.26 —1.29 28.19
P2
75 —.02—.41 —.02 —.43
P3
75 .02 —1.17 —.10 —12.79
P4
75Table 8
Optimal Retirement Age, and Equalizing Increase in
Consumption, Perfect Annuities Markets
Retirement Age,
(S,a, p) R+ 19
Equalizing Increase in Consumption
Cohort—Weighted Unweighted
69 101 69 101
E E Z
55 70 55 70 (.6,.9,.ol)
P 64 —3.92 —1.27 —3.92 —1.27 64 .193.94 .37 3.95 P2 64 .012.78 .11 2.78 P 64
(.7,.6,.ol)
P 61 —6.18 7.60 —5.647.60 62 .774.10 .89 4.10 62 0 3.39 .12 3.39
P4 62
(.75,.6,.03)
P 58 —.172.89 .08 5.35 58 1.054.93 1.24 4.93
P3 58 .375.25 .63 5.25
P4 58
(.6,1.1, .03)
P 59 —4.32 13.85 —3.1213.85 P1 60 .734.61 .92 4.61 P 60 .113.10 .16 3.10
P4 60
(.8, .55, .08)
P 75 —5.33 —6.92 —5.43 —7.13 75 -1.29 -.83 -1.29-.83
P3 75 —4.03 —5.44 —4.13 —5.44
P4 75
(.8, .45,.08)
P1 75 —5.33 —7.11 —5.43 —7.18
75 —1.29 —.83 —1.29 —.83
P3 75 —4.03 —5.49 —4.13 —5.49
P4 7518
the results in Tables 7 and 8, this result depends entirely on the effect
of uncertainty on the assumption that the consumer's net worth be non-
negative. When we assume a perfect market for actuarial annuities, the
retirement age is not affected by an increase in uncertainty of the size
we assume.
The final four columns in the Tables are based upon a comparison of
utilities under assumptions P1 through P3 to that attained under P4. The
elasticity of utility with respect to consumption in (5) is:
31nU/1nC =
Thenumbers are calculated as:
N2 N2 N2
=100[1 - Up.(t)/Up4(t)]/[ C(t)/Up.()j
t=N1 t=N1 N1
where the N. are arbitrary ages. They show the percentage increase in
consumption necessary in each period to equalize the sum of utilities under
assumption P, i=l,2,3, to that under P4. The calculations are presented
separately for the consumption increments required to equate utility
streams during early older years, ages 55—69, then during later older
years, ages 70—101.
I present results separately with and without weights implied by the
number of persons surviving in the cohort of men age 20 in 1930. The
first set of equalizing increases in consumption implicitly weights all
persons in the cohort equally, while the second set puts a higher weight
on the utility of those who survive longer. Which of these two sets of
results deserves more attention depends on one's purposes: If we are
concerned with the average welfare of the whole cohort, the first set of
results is the important one, for it recognizes that the cohort declines19
in size as it ages. If we are more concerned about maintaIning incomes of
older persons, the second set of estimates should be focussedupon, for it
gives greater weight to those who survive longer.
The most striking result in the last four columns is therelatively
small percentage increase in consumption required toequate the utility
stream to that obtained with perfect foresight. Only when noborrowing is
possible and forecasts of the probabilities of survival are completely
rigid does utility in the later part of the life cycle differ substantially
from that attainable under maximization with perfect foresight. Ifpeople
forecast in ways implied by the results in Section II, the shortfalls in
utility are very small.
It seems quite fair to conclude, subject to the restrictions of the
assumptions in our maximization problem, that rapid increases in longevity
in the past fifty years did not result in persons who survivedlonger than
they initially forecast consuming much less in old age than if they had known
cx ante how survival probabilities would change. Though the increases were
swift by historical standards, they were slow enough to allow thetypical
consumer who updates forecasts to adjust consumption and saving sufficiently
to come fairly close to an cx post optimum. Munnell (1977)suggests that
in the early 1970s the intergenerational subsidy implicit in SocialSecurity
could have been half of benefits. With replacement rates of 50percent, this
far exceeds the rates implied by Tables 7 and 8. The resultssuggest that
the subsidy cannot be justified as compensation to a generation whose
average longevity exceeded its initial expectations.
The close approximation of utility in old age under
P2, P3 and P4
suggests that people form their subjective horizons in ways consistent with
optimizing behavior in the presence of information costs. It is quite20
easy to acquire information on current life tables. I showed in Section II
that people use that information when they form their expectations, and
I demonstrated here that those expectations are nearly sufficient to allow
the attainment of an ex post actuarial lifetime utIlity maximum. People
do not make the more complex calculations necessary to predict changes in
survival probabilities; but their failure to do so does not, as we have
seen here, reduce their lifetime utility much below what it would have been
had they made these calculations.
V. Conclusions and New Directions
Increases in life expectancy in the U.S. and other Western countries
represent as important a demographic/labor—market change as do the often
studied 1950's baby boom and the increased labor—force participation of
married women. This paper has examined awareness of this demographic
change by individuals as they project their life expectancy, and whether
their projections are internally consistent and based upon determinants
that coincide with the evidence of epidemiological and demographic studies.
I find that they do not extrapolate when they determine their subjective
horizons, though they are aware of levels of and improvements within current
life tables. People skew subjective survival probabilities in a way that
implies the subjective distribution has greater variance than its actuarial
counterpart; and the subjective variance decreases with age. They base
their subjective life expectancies disproportionately on their relatives'
longevity; and long—lived relatives increase uncertainty about the
subjective distribution of survival probabilities.
The findings on the subjective horizon were used to examine the
consumption/leisure choices of a utility—maximizing consumer over his21
lifetime. Shortfalls in utility in oldage because of skewed or imperfect
forecasting of survival probabilities were found to be relatively small.
This implies that large subsidies to retirees undertoday's Social Security
system cannot be justified as compensation for an unexpectedly long
retirement for which they failed to save.
In Sections II and III I discussed some uses of the results in
modifying theoretical and empirical work on life—cycle behavior. Alarge
number of other implications arise from thesefindings. The Implied skewness
of the subjective survival distribution means thatactuarially fair
insurance and annuity schemes will have nonneutral behavioral effects.The
extent of the distortion can be lessened, and sellers ofsuch plans can
undercut their competitors, by offering plans basedon skewed survival
distributions that have the same expected value as their actuarial
counterparts. Also, in a world with mandatory or customary retirement at
age 65 or 70, skewed survival probabilities will lead people to invest more
than otherwise in assets whose returns are concentratedduring retirement
rather than during the person's working years.
The existence of demographic consistency and the failure ofpeople
to extrapolate changing life tables supports the use of current life
expectancy in cross—section studies of aggregate savings (see, eg. Feldstein,
1977). In these, though, an average of life expectancies byage weighted
by the age distribution of the population is the appropriateproxy for the
average horizon. Time—series studies of savings and labor supply should
account for increasing life expectancy and its transformation into the
subjective horizon that determines behavior. If the results in Section IV
are correct, and greater longevity Is consumed mostly as leisure, failure
to include the increasing horizon in such studies will bias estimates of22
the effects of any other variable containing a trend.
Changing distributions of subjective survival probabilities must
be modelled in studies of bequest behavior. Unplanned bequests (see David
and Menchik, 1981) will be lower when, as our results show, people fail
to forecast reductions in mortality. Empirical work that examines bequests
in different population cohorts must also consider how they are affected
by changing mortality experience and its relationship to subjective
horizons.
In any area of economic behavior, where length or uncertainty of
the horizon affects decisions, secular changes in longevity must be
considered. However, modelling those changes cannot be done mechanically;
as I have shown, they are processed into subjective survival decisions
only incompletely, and in ways that appear fairly complex. Empirical
studies that model these sorts of behavior ignore changing life
expectancy and its effects on subjective survival probabilities at the
expense of realism, and with the price of possibly incorrect behavioral
implications. Theoretical studies that treat actuarial data as directly
motivating behavior miss much of the potential richness of their models
if they ignore how those data are transformed into the subjective proba—
bilities that are the proximate determinants of the phenomena under study.REFERENCES
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Questionnaire on Subjective Life Expectancy
Part One
Please answer the questions on this page before going to the nextpage.
Please do not change the answers here once you have completed thispage.
Your age at your last birthday:_______years.
Your sex: N F
How old do you expect you will live to be?_______years.
What is your subjective probability of living to at leastage 60? _______percent.
What is your subjective probability of living to at leastage 80? _______percent.
Part Two
Pleaseanswer each question as accurately as your knowledge of the facts allows.
1. a. Was your father born in the U.S. or Canada? Yes_______No
b. Is he still alive? Yes_______No_______
c.If you answered "Yes" on b; how old is he?—_____years.
d. If you answered "No" on b; how old was he when he died?_______years.
2—6 ——Thesewere identical to 1, except they asked about the respondent's
mother and grandparents.
7. Do you smoke more than 5 cigarettes/day on average? Yes_______No
8. Do you engage in vigorous exercise (tennis, running, swimming, etc.) more
than once a week on average? Yes_______No
9. Have you ever been diagnosed as having a medical condition that had a
non—negligible probability of being fatal? Yes_______No_______
25FOOTNOTES
1. Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1979,P. 1.
2. The numbers are even more striking for nonwhites. For example, between
1939—41 and 1980 average years of life remaining atage 2.5 increased by
7.4 among nonwhite males; for females the analogous figure is 12.8years.
(See Vital Statistics of the United States, 1977 Volume II, Section 5,
and unpublished data for 1980.)
3. A detailed description of the construction of life tables is provided
in Keyfitz (1977).
4. Comparing data for males age 25, life expectancy was: 1) 70.8years in
1960/62, 70.7 years in 1970/72, and 71.5 years in 1976/78 in West Germany;
2) 70.4 years in 1960—64, 71 years in 1970, and 71.9 years in 1978 in
France; and 3) 70.8 years in 1960/62, 71.1 years in 1967/69, and 72
years in 1976/78 in England and Wales. For females the comparable
figures are: 1)75.3, 76.1 and 77.4 in West Germany; 2) 76.6, 77.8 and
79.3 in France, and 3) 76.1, 76.8 and 78.6 in England and Wales. (See
Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, 1980; INSEE, Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1980; and
United Kingdom, Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1981.
There is nothing inevitable about these increases; age—specific death rates
rose in the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1975 for all adult age groups
(U.S. Census Bureau, International Population Reports, Series P—95, No. 74,
September 1980).
5. Robert Goldfarb and Ernst Stromsdorfer provided helpful advIce in the
construction of the questionnaire.
6. The age distribution of the respondents was: 26—29, N=29; 30—34, N76;
35—39, N=75; 40—44, N=68; 45—49, N60; 50—54, N=34; 55—59, N4O; and
60—65, N=29.
7. The age distribution of these respondents was: 20—24, N=22; 25—29, N50;
30—34, N=64; 35—39, N=43; 40—44, N=28; 45—49, N=24; 50—54, N43; 55—59,
N31; 60—64, N=29; 65—70, N=29. The questionnaire was the same as that
sent to economists except that survival probabilities were elicited with
questions styled as "how many chances in ten. .. . 7"
8. Where possible in this Section I use notation that has become standard
among demographers. Thus, for example, what I denote later as p0 is
the ratio of 160 to from the life tables for white males in l97.
9. Data on mortality by occupation are collected only infrequently, but
they support this view clearly. In 1950 in the United States, age
specific mortality rates of male college professors in ten—year age groups
between 25 and 64 were roughly half those of all males, and only about 2/3
of those of all professionals. (U.S. Public Health Service, Vital
Statistics Special Report, Volume 53, No. 2, p. 82.) In England and Wales
in 1959—63 the figures for males in age groups between 25 and 64 present
essentially this same pattern.(HNSO, Decennial Supplement to the
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Registrar General's Report, 1961, Occupational Mortality Tables, p. 97,
99, 192.) Rosen and Taubman (1979) present results on a recent sample
of older men showing much lower mortality rates among those with more
education.
10. The conclusion that subjective expectancies correspond closely to
actuarial is further strengthened by the sparse evidence from the 63
white females ages 20—70 who responded to the random survey. For them
x + eS =79.40,within two standard errors of the x + e0 =80.97,and
significantly above the x +eSreportedby the white males in the sample.
11. The failure of the respondents to extrapolatepast improvements is matched
by the apparent inability of leading demographers to predict thechanges
that have occurred. For example, in 1945one expert's most optimistic
forecast for 1975 was that e would be 71.4 for the entirepopulation; it
was in fact 72.6. The forecast was sufficiently optimistic formortality
up through age 68, but insufficiently optimistic for mortality thereafter.
(Dublin et al, 1949, pp. 172—174.)
12. That exercise increases longevity is suggested strongly by the studies
discussed in Paffenberger and Hyde (1980).
13. A number of possible problems in the expanded version of (4) were
examined. 1) There maybea simultaneity between e and smoking.
While I cannot disprove this, in logit equations relating smoking to
x and to all the dummy variables for parents' and grandparents'
longevity, none of the latter set had a coefficient significantly
different from zero. Similar logit equations for exercise yielded
similarly insignificant results. 2) I specified Z so that the response
to the longevity of male and female forebears is the same. When this
restriction is relaxed, there is a lesser response to the experience
of grandfathers than that of grandmothers; there is, though, a greater
response to father's experience than to mother's. In any case the
restriction that the responses be equal cannot be rejected statistically.
3) Finally, none of the conclusions changes when eS and e0 are
substituted for x + eS and x +e0in (4). x
x x
14. Elandt—Johnson and Johnson (1980) discuss the application of this
distribution by demographers to characterizing survival probabilities
implicit in life tables.
15. The other observations were dropped because the mean implied by the
c. and exceeded 100 years. This occurred for persons whose
subjective survival probabilities to ages 60 and 80 differed only
slightly, resulting in absurdly high implied survival probabilities
beyond age 90. In those cases the Weibull clearly does not describe
the subjective survival distributions very well.
16. Maintenance of consumption has only recently been dealt with analytically
as the main goal of social insurance programs by economists interested
in these programs. See Hamermesh (1982) on unemployment insurance,
and Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) on retirement benefits.28
17. The function in (5) is suggested by that used by Gordon and Blinder
(1980).
18. P3 (t,T) is calculated for T_te by reducing P2(t,T) by twenty percent
of a weighted sum of (1—P2(t,T)) and (P2(t,T)—P2(t, t + e)), with
weights based on the fraction (T—t)/e. For T—t>e' the probabilities
P3 are increased by the proportion required to equate life expectancy
under P2 and P3.
19. For P1 through P4 I assume T =81,i.e., maximum attainable age is 100.
Under each scheme the probabilities of survival beyond age 85 are derived
by prorating 185 for the particular year by the ratio 1/1, x>85, for
1970. Interpolations of 1 within five—year age intervals were made
for 20x85, as were linear interpolations between 1930 and 1940,
1940 and 1950, etc., through 1970 and 1979. Finally, under P2 through
P4 forecasts were assumed to be based on the life table for 1979.
20. The life—cycle earnings function is Mincer's (1974, p. 92), for annual
earnings of nonfarm white males in 1959:
n Y =+.068X-.0009X2+ g(Z)
where Y are earnings, X is experience, and g(Z) is a vector of other
variables (schooling and weeks worked). I set X=4 at age 20 (tl) in
the simulations.
21. I assume initial wealth is zero and ignore any bequest motive; its
inclusion would make the simulation,which already requires the repeated
construction of an optimal dynamic program, too costly to be practical.